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Abstract
This paper introduces a two-sided methodological framework for studies on cooperation
based on a new game design. Presented games are continuous prisoner’s dilemma games
with positive and negative presentations of an identically structured decision problem.
Decision makers can choose an individual level of cooperation from a given range of possible
actions. Within a cross-cultural experimental study involving Palestinian and Israeli
subjects we test for a strategic presentation bias applying our framework. Palestinians show
a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Israel no
presentation eﬀect is observed. Critically discussing our ﬁndings, we argue that cross-cultural
comparison leads to only partially meaningful and opposed results if only one treatment
condition is evaluated. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consid-
eration of diﬀerent presentations of identical decision problems within cross-cultural research.
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1 Introduction
Economic literature on experimental economics has delivered an overwhelming evidence
for a substantial gap between theoretical predictions deducted from standard game theory
and actual behavior of subjects manifested in laboratory experiments around the world
(e.g. G¨ uth et al., 1982; G¨ uth and Tietz, 1990; Fehr et al., 1993; Berg et al., 1995; G¨ uth,
1995; Ledyard, 1995; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Fahr and Irlenbusch, 2000; Janssen
and Ahn, 2003).
Several frameworks try to explain the remarkable inﬂuences on subjects’ behavior guid-
ing choices away from predicted standard equilibria. These concepts either challenge the
concept of expected utility maximization (c.f. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 1992), ques-
tion the homo economicus supposition by assuming heterogeneous and boundedly rational
actors with limited cognitive abilities (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001; Kahneman, 2003),
or imbed social preferences of individuals evoking equitable outcomes (Rabin, 1991; Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Further studies describe the inﬂuence of
population-speciﬁc determinants like social norms, values and attitudes which depend on
the cultural background of decision makers (Roth et al., 1991; Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart
et al., 2001; Henrich et al., 2001; Cardenas and Carpenter, 2004).
The detection of human values, social preferences, and mechanisms and their impact
on human decisions and behavior creates one of the most popular research ﬁelds in recent
experimental economics work. A growing body of theoretical and experimental research
on nationwide or cross-cultural similarities and diﬀerences emphasizes the importance of
research accompanying globalization. Analyzing national data and conducting empirical
studies in diﬀerent countries Gambetta (1988), Putnam (1993), and Fukuyama (1995,
2001) have investigated the link between economic performance of institutions and na-
tions and the inherent social capital, including the ability to cooperate and to trust, of
involved populations. They conclude that social capital strongly aﬀects the eﬃciency of
organizations and an economy’s economic success. Furthermore, Knack and Kefer (1997),
1La Porta et al. (1997), and Fukuyama (1995, 2001) have documented that social and civic
norms of cooperation have a signiﬁcant impact on institutions and aggregate economic
activity.
Key attribute of so far conducted cross-cultural experimental studies (e.g. Anderson
et al., 2000; Henrich, 2000; Henrich et al., 2001; Buchan et al., 2004a,b) is the sequential
application of an identical experimental setup within selected areas while controlling for
stakes, language, experimenter eﬀects and demographic background variables (Roth et al.,
1991, Camerer and Kagel, 1995; Walkowitz et al., 2004; Dakkak et al., 2006).
Extracted data are to be analyzed and compared to identify and evaluate matching or
divergent preferences and behavior. However, present approaches usually exclusively ap-
ply uni-dimensional and positively presented designs provoking positive (e.g. cooperative,
trusting, fair) actions which might induce unilateral choices in the given context. The
outcome of these uni-directional presentations of strategic interaction problems are com-
monly used to derive more general conclusions about the distribution of speciﬁc behavioral
attitudes within certain societies and their potential impact on economic variables.
In a positive presentation of an experimental design the ﬁrst player i (e.g. ﬁrst mover,
sender, divider) can usually contribute, send, or transfer a certain amount ai of a given ini-
tial endowment Xi to a matched second player j (e.g. second mover, responder, receiver),
chosen from a given interval [0,Xi]. By choosing ai player i temporarily increases player
j’s (intermediate) payoﬀ πj. In a second stage player j can either accept or reject player i’s
oﬀer (e.g. ultimatum game), transfer a certain amount back to player i (e.g. investment
game), determine an eﬀort (e.g. gift exchange game), or do nothing (e.g. dictator game).
In the literature player i’s choice ai is typically interpreted as player i’s cooperation, trust,
or fairness attitude toward player j.
Theoretically, for most standard experimental designs containing a pattern as described
above - forming the foundation of experimental economics’ research - a complementarily
structured decision framework can be derived containing identical types and number of
players, institutions and payoﬀ-space but diﬀering in eligible strategies. In this paper we
will show that it is essential to evaluate results taken from several experimental studies,
including a complementarity of game-designs - particularly in cross-cultural research. Tak-
ing multidimensional ﬁndings into account might not only enrich standard socio-economic
theory but also reﬁne our experimental methodology.
Closely related to the complementary application of games is the ﬁeld of framing and
2presentation in games. Several experimental studies have shown that diﬀerently framed
descriptions of decision tasks can lead to diﬀerent behavior (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt, 2006; Dufwenberg et al., 2006). In the broad ﬁeld of
framing1, studies dealing with problems creating either positive externalities (public good)
or negative externalities (public bad) are well established (e.g. Andreoni, 1995; Sonne-
mans et al., 1998; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999; Cookson, 2000; Park, 2000). Results
from these publications suggest that experimental designs enabling positive externalities
are aligned with signiﬁcantly higher cooperation levels compared to setups allowing for
negative externalities.
One goal of our work is to merge the cross-cultural experimental approach with meth-
ods from framing and presentation literature. To the best of our knowledge up to now no
study exists that deals with the inﬂuence of diﬀerent presentation forms of similar games on
cross-populational or cross-cultural comparison. With this procedure we want to demon-
strate the following: First, results obtained from the application of one-sided designs can
lead to only partly valid results and conclusions about population-speciﬁc behavior. This
holds especially true if results are compared across cultural borders. Second, results from
two-sided designs (c.f. public good and public bad settings) can not be generalized across
diﬀerent cultures.
To prove presentation-dependent cooperation behavior we will introduce a multidimen-
sional methodological framework consisting of two game designs. Both games - named the
‘First Kiss Game’ and the ‘War of the Roses Game’ - are positive and negative presenta-
tions of a strategically and formally identical decision problem. The terms ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ strategic presentation are chosen with respect to a positive or negative exter-
nality caused by one player’s actions and not with respect to diﬀerent value- or norm-
oriented presentations. Both designs represent continuous prisoner’s dilemma and public
good games in which subjects can choose an individual level of cooperation from a given
range of possible actions. Thus, the question whether to cooperate or to defect is not a
binary choice. Both conditions allow total free-riding to both players. On the other hand,
there exists a combination of strategies that generates a maximal mutual beneﬁt for both
players.
We will test for a strategic presentation bias under two diﬀerent conditions in an one-
1For an elaborate review of the framing literature in general and the inﬂuence of loaded instructions
refer to Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006).
3shot experimental setting run with Palestinian and Israeli subjects. Our Palestinian data
show that the presentation of the dilemma signiﬁcantly inﬂuences decision makers’ choices.
In the positive situation substantially more cooperation is manifested. Moreover, in both
games subjects do deviate remarkably from Nash and Pareto solutions. The experiment
conducted in Israel yielded to diﬀerent results. There, on an aggregate level, no signiﬁcant
presentation eﬀect can be detected. Nevertheless, aggregated data show that neither the
Nash equilibrium nor the Pareto optimal strategy is played.
Comparing the level of cooperation under each condition across the two populations
leads to opposite conclusions on relative country-speciﬁc cooperation behavior. In contrast
to this a total evaluation of all data gathered from each of the two populations shows no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the cooperation behavior. Our results underline the need for a more
context-speciﬁc evaluation of experimental data in cross-cultural investigations and sheds
new light on the impact of presentation conditioned on values, preferences and social norms
within cultural habitats. Therefore, we will argue that for deriving a conclusion about
a population’s cooperative behavior, especially within a cross-national context, diﬀerent
presentations of logically identical experimental setups must be considered and evaluated
adequately.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next part we will introduce
our multidimensional framework by illustrating the design of two games named ‘First Kiss
game’ (FK) and ‘War of the Roses game’ (WR). We will show formally an internal analogy
- both designs are theoretically identical - and external analogy to the standard prisoner’s
dilemma game and the public good game. In the third section, we describe the method and
procedure we applied conducting the experimental study in the Westbank and Jerusalem.
In part four, we present population-speciﬁc results. We compare data within and across
populations. The ﬁnal section discusses our ﬁndings and their impact on cross-national
research, concludes and gives advices for future research.
2 Experimental Framework
In this section we will introduce the two games and discuss their features. Our experimental
framework is based on the classical prisoner’s dilemma game (PD). The PD sets up a social
dilemma for two players in which one strategy leads to the global optimum while the
dominant strategy, or best response function, leads to an ineﬃcient outcome. The game
4is typically conducted as a symmetric two-person game with two strategies: ‘cooperate’
(C) and ‘defect’ (D), where ‘defect’ strictly dominates ‘cooperate’. Formally, the classical
PD can be described as a 2 × 2 game, satisfying the PD-condition: T > R > P > S. T
represents the temptation, R is the reward, P stands for the punishment and S embodies
the sucker’s payoﬀ (see table 1). The level of the conﬂict of interest among the two players
is determined by the degree of dichotomy of payoﬀs. The higher the potential of conﬂict,
the more likely both parties will behave competitively - guided by a payoﬀ-maximizing




Table 1: 2 × 2-matrix representing the classical prisoner’s dilemma game for two players 1 and 2.
In literature almost exclusively binary choice settings of prisoner’s dilemma games
are applied to analyze cooperative behavior (c.f. Axelrod, 1984). Instead of using a
binary choice structure we apply two continuous games. In these games players can decide
on a certain degree of cooperation. Our design allows subjects to choose from a range
of disposable strategies. Moreover, both games are equivalent in logical and strategical
terms. They only diﬀer in their strategic presentation to the decision makers.
The scope of literature dealing with continuous prisoner’s dilemma games is still rela-
tively small. Most contributions are delivered from the ﬁeld of theoretical biology. In this
area results from simulations over several time periods enlighten questions on evolutionary
strategies as well as general aspects like interspeciﬁc mutualism (Doebli and Knowlton,
1998), the evolvement of cooperative behavior from an initially selﬁsh state (Killingback
et al., 1999), and the robustness of such cooperation (Roberts and Sherratt, 1998; Wahl
and Nowak, 1999). Furthermore, Smale (1980) analyses ﬁx points in repeated prisoner’s
dilemma games with continuous choices and bounded memory and rationality. Verho-
eﬀ (1999) introduces the Trader’s Dilemma and theoretically analyzes the structure of
this game. In the majority of these studies the cost of cooperation is understood as an
investment into a partnership.
52.1 The First Kiss Game
We start with the First Kiss game. At the beginning of the game, two matched players i
and j obtain an initial endowment X = Xi = Xj. Each player then has the opportunity
to transfer an integer part a of X, nothing, or the entire amount X to the opposite player.
Both players choose a ∈ [0,1,...,X − 1,X] simultaneously. Each amount a, which is
transferred to the paired player, will be multiplied by factor k yielding to an eﬃciency
gain by transferring a positive amount a. Players’ payoﬀs consist of the initial endowment
X minus the transferred amount a plus the obtained and multiplied amount k a transferred
by the opposite player. Formally, player i’s payoﬀ function is given by:
πFK
i = Xi − aFK
i + k   aFK
j , with Xi = X,aFK
i ∧ aFK
j ∈ [0,X], and k > 1 (1)
The payoﬀ of the opposite player j is calculated analogously. The only Nash equilibrium is
a∗
i = a∗
j = 0. Player i anticipates player j’s choice aFK
j = 0 and will therefore also choose
aFK
i = 0. The collective optimal choice is ˆ ai = ˆ aj = X since it maximizes the joint payoﬀ
ΠFK = πi + πj.
2.2 The War of the Roses Game
The design of this second game is equivalent to the ﬁrst game, but instead of choosing
an amount a which is transferred to the opposite player, decision makers must choose an
integer which is transferred from the other player. Again two players i and j simultaneously
interact. Initially, both receive an endowment X = Xi = Xj. Each player then has the
opportunity to transfer a part a, nothing, or the entire amount X from the matched
player. Thus, again, both players simultaneously choose a ∈ [0,1,...,X − 1,X]. The
diﬀerence X − a, which is mutually left, will be multiplied with k. Thus, by transferring
low amounts or nothing eﬃciency increases. In contrast to the FK-game, the amount a,
which is transferred is not multiplied. Players’ payoﬀs are determined by the multiplied
diﬀerence of their initial endowments X and the amount a taken by the opposite player
and the amount a which players take away from the counterpart. Formally, player i′s
payoﬀ function is given by:
πWR
i = (Xi − aWR
j )   k + aWR
i , with Xi = X,aWR
i ∧ aWR
j ∈ [0,X], and k > 1 (2)
Player j’s payoﬀ is calculated analogously. The only Nash equilibrium is a∗
i = Xj and
a∗
j = Xi. Player i anticipates player j’s choice aWR
j = Xi and will therefore also choose
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i = Xj. The optimal collective choice is ˆ ai = ˆ aj = 0 since it maximizes the joint payoﬀ
ΠWR = πi + πj.
2.3 Internal Equivalence and External Analogy
We will now take a closer look at the formal structure of the two games. It is to be shown
that both games are from a rational perspective identical, yielding to internal equivalence.
Internal equivalence enables a control for a presentation bias applying both treatments.
Furthermore, either case represents a special case of the PD and the standard public good
game (PG), resulting in external analogy. External analogy allows an eﬀective application
of our methodological framework for research focused on cooperation.
As a starting point, both games have an identical incentive structure, given equal
initial endowments. It holds that X = Xi = Xj and X = XFK = XWR which is a crucial
precondition for our framework. Partial cooperation of player i under the ﬁrst condition
is manifested by aFK
i > 0, full cooperation by aFK
i = Xi. Under the second condition,
player i cooperates partially by choosing aWR
i < Xj, and fully by choosing aWR
i = 0.
Consequently, in our games cooperation can be understood as transferring something to
(or taking it away from oneself), as well as not transferring everything away from (or
leaving it to) the counterpart.
Formally, this yields the following equation:
aFK
i ≡ Xj − aWR
i (3)
Correspondingly, we can say that not transferring an amount (or leaving it to oneself)
in the ﬁrst condition is the same as transferring the same amount (or taking it away) from




It is obvious that in both games the attributed ownership of X does not necessarily
correspond with the individual power of control on X. Under both conditions, player i
decides on the transfer amount ai, either as a positive or a negative transfer to the opposite
player. Similarly, player i depends on player j’s decisions on the same decision task. Thus,
player i’s payoﬀ πi consists of two parts - a self-determined component πiA and a part πiB
resulting from player j’s actions, yielding πi = πiA+πiB. Player i’s self-determined payoﬀ
7fraction in the FK-game can be stated as:
πiA = Xi − aFK
i (5)
Player i’s foreign determined payoﬀ fraction in the FK-game can be stated as:
πiB = k   aFK
j (6)
Thus, player i’s total payoﬀ in the FK-game is given by:
πi = πiA + πiB = Xi − aFK
i + k   aFK
j (7)
Given equation (1/7) we can substitute the equivalents (3) and (4) in equations (5) and
(6). This yields to equation (8), which is equal to equation (2):
πi = πiB + πiA = (Xi − aWR
j )   k + aWR
i (8)





























πjB = k   aFK
i = k   (XWR
j − aWR
i )
πiB = k   aFK












8Figure 1: Graphical illustration for the equivalence of the two games.
Figure 1 displays a graphical illustration of this equivalence. The initial endowment X
for both players is the same in both games. Thus, XFK
i and XWR
j form an isosceles triangle
as shown in the upper right section of the ﬁgure. Player i chooses in the FK-game his self-
determined payoﬀ XFK
i − aFK
i (thin line). In the WR-treatment player i can chose aWR
i
(thick line), which ensures him the same self-determined payoﬀ. If player i does so, the left
over XWR
j −aWR
i equals the amount aFK
i transferred in the FK-treatment. These amounts
are part of player j’s foreign-determined payoﬀ function and are multiplied with k which is
shown in the lower right section. The multiplier k is described as a straight line. The lower
left section of the graphic illustrates analogously the self-determined payoﬀ of player j and
the upper left section the foreign-determined payoﬀ of player i. This illustrates, that in
each strategy space of the two games there exists a strategy ai or a strategy-combination
(ai;aj) that also exists in the corresponding game in terms of cooperation, individual and
collective payoﬀ.
To show external analogy of our continuous games with a classical binary-choice PD
we write down the 2 × 2-payoﬀ matrix form of both designs including only the extreme
points of total (e.g. aFK
i = 10;aWR




C1 k · X,k · X 0,X + k · X
D1 X + k · X,0 X,X
Table 2: 2 × 2-matrix, representing the prisoner’s dilemma game.
The PD condition (1 + k)   X > k   X > X > 0 is satisﬁed for all k > 1 for both games.
In our experiment this condition is fulﬁlled, with k = 2. Given these parameters, by
linear interpolation payoﬀs from the discrete payoﬀ matrix can be obtained2. Having a
freely pre-determined range of possible actions a allows to obtain a non-binary measure of
cooperation.
In the last part of this section, we show external analogy of both games to a typical
PG-design. The payoﬀ function of a common 2-person PG is given by:
πPG
i = Xi − ai + k  
ai + aj
2
, with i  = j, and k > 1
2See also Verhoeﬀ (1998).
9Xi represents player i’s initial endowment. The parameter ai is the investment into the
public good. Accordingly, Xi − ai represents the investment into the private good. All
investments made to the public good are multiplied by the factor k. The fraction of one
half of the increased public pie is returned to both players i and j by the addition to
their investments into the private good. For k < 1 it is rational for both players to invest
nothing into the public good since the public pie shrinks. In the case of k > 1 both players
can increase their personal income by investing into the public good. However, in this case
each player has a strong incentive to free-ride hoping to reach even higher returns caused
by a positive investment of the second player. From the initial PG-equation we get:
πi = Xi − (1 −
k
2
)   ai + k  
aj
2
⇐⇒ πi = Xi − θ   ai + k∗   θ   aj, with θ = 1 −
k
2




The payoﬀ-function of the FK-game was given in equation (1) by:
πFK
i = Xi − aFK
i + k   aFK
j
It is evident that both games are of the same type: A PG with parameter k∗ is formally
similar to the FK-game with parameter k. Because of internal equivalence among FK and
WR it is obvious that the WR-game is a PG too. Contrary to the PG, in FK and WR
there is no back ﬂow of own investments. Thus, each ai > 0 is transferred directly to the
opposite player thereby providing a lower individual incentive to cooperate.
3 Experimental Method and Procedure
The experiments were conducted in May 2006. The Palestinian3 sessions were run at
the AlQuds University located in the Westbank, close to the city of Jerusalem. Israeli
observations were gained at the RatioLab of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In
both universities students from diﬀerent departments participated. Showing up for the
experiment each student received a ﬁxed payment of 25 NIS.
Two sessions with 20 subjects4 were conducted in each university applying pen and
3At the moment, a Palestinian state does not exist. Most of our subjects are formally citizens of the
states of Israel and Jordan. Nevertheless, we will refer to them as Palestinians to ease the notation.
4In Israel only subjects with limited experimental experience (excluding previous collaborations in trust
game, prisoner’s dilemma, gift exchange, or public good game experiments) were allowed to take part in
the experiments. Palestinian subjects had no experimental experience.
10paper method. In the ﬁrst session subjects decided ﬁrst under the FK-condition and then
under the WR-treatment. Consequently, the second session consisted of the run of the WR-
condition ﬁrst and the FK-treatment second. In both sessions subjects were not informed
about the subsequent second decision task. All experimental stages were run as one-shot
setups. The experimental design ensured that the ﬁrst stage of the experiment delivered
one independent observation for each participant. In this paper we will concentrate on the
primarily played games, since we want to focus on the analysis of the unbiased presentation
eﬀect.
At the beginning of the experiment subjects were immediately separated into cabins to
avoid any communication among them. Instructions were given to the students before the
particular game was played. For both games instructions were absolutely identical except
the technical presentation of the design of the two games to strictly avoid a framing bias
due to any instruction diﬀerence5. Translations from German into Arabic and Hebrew
were made under the supervision of the authors by native Arabic and Hebrew speakers
living in Germany. Final versions were back-translated into German language according
to back-translation method (Brislin, 1970). This method guarantees mutual consistency
of instructions and ensures that no translation errors regarding the task and the cadence
occurred. Moreover, we controlled for neutral language to avoid further framing eﬀects,
such as labeling eﬀects (Ross and Ward, 1996; Liberman et al., 2004) and other context
framings (Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt, 2006)6. Furthermore, we did not explicitly state,
that subjects generate positive or negative externalities for the paired player by realizing
a transfer. These, and terms like ‘give’ and ‘take’ were strictly avoided. In the verbal
speciﬁcation of the experimental procedure only the direction of the conducted transfer
diﬀered - transfers were to be realized to player j or from player j. After having ﬁnished
the lecture of the instructions students were asked to ﬁll in a short test questionnaire to
check their comprehension of the game structure.
Subjects were initially endowed with X = 10 Talers in the opening of every game7. The
5See Appendix for instructions.
6See also: Cooper et al. (1999) for loaded instructions issues, Burnham et al. (2000) for the inﬂuence
of wording on social aspects, and Baldry (1986) and Alm et al. (1992) for the inﬂuence of ethical aspects
on taxation.
7Taler=Experimental Currency. During the experiment all transfers were made in Taler. The exchange
rate from Taler to NIS is 1 Taler = 2.5 NIS. We adjusted expected hourly payoﬀs to the average hourly
wage of a local student helper.
11multiplier k was ﬁxed with k = 2. The individual payoﬀ in the Nash equilibrium was 10
Talers, for each player. The Pareto optimum outcome generated 20 Talers, respectively. In
the run of the experiment participants received no feedback on matched player’s decisions.
After running the experiment two questionnaires were passed out. In the ﬁrst ques-
tionnaire we asked participants for their ﬁrst-order beliefs on the behavior of the matched
player8. The second questionnaire covered socio-demographic questions. At the end of the
session the outcome for each participant was calculated, converted into NIS, and paid out.
Both experiments were run by local helpers unknown to the participants compre-
hensively instructed and supported by the authors, who stayed in the background. We
are aware that this might result in an experimenter eﬀect. We decided to choose this
procedure to avoid self-presentation and face-saving eﬀects (Bond and Hwang, 1986) of
unexperienced subjects resulting from the presence of people from foreign countries. Since
we are interested in the pure presentation eﬀect this procedure seems to be justiﬁed.
4 Results
In this section we present the results of our study. First, we start with our ﬁndings in the
Palestinian population. In the second subsection we will present the Israeli data. Finally,
we will cross and compare results from both societies. For our analysis, it is necessary
to transform WR-amounts (WR) into FK-values (WR’) as described in the theoretical
section to enable a comparison of results from both treatments with one common measure
for cooperation9.
8We are aware of the fact that stated beliefs can be biased by prior decisions already undertaken.
However, since actual unbiased decisions are more valuable for our analysis we agreed upon this procedure.
9Recall that a
FK
i ≡ Xj − a
WR
i . Transformed WR-transfers are denoted as WR’.
124.1 Palestinian Choices
In the following, table 4 gives an overview on Palestinians’ aggregated actions and beliefs
in both treatments:
Actions Beliefs
FK WR’ FK WR’
Mean: 7.10 2.65 6.05 2.75
Median: 7 2 5 2
Mode: 5/10 2 5 0
SD: 2.36 2.08 2.89 2.34
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for Palestinian choices.
Result 1: The formal presentation of the game inﬂuences Palestinian subjects’ actions
substantially. Cooperation is higher under the FK-condition than in the WR-treatment.
SUPPORT: On average, under the FK-condition 7.10 Talers are transferred to the
opposite player, contrary to the WR-treatment where 2.65 Talers are left. The observed
treatment eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.0001, Mann-Whitney test, two-sided). More-
over, in the FK-treatment the quadratic distance to the Pareto optimum (∆2 = 0.137)
solution is signiﬁcantly smaller than to the Nash equilibrium (∆2 = 0.557, p = 0.0019,
Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-sided)10. In the WR-treatment the opposite holds. Here,
the quadratic distance to the Pareto optimum (∆2 = 0.582) is signiﬁcantly bigger than
to the Nash equilibrium (∆2 = 0.112, p = 0.0007, Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-
sided). Our ﬁndings get additional support evaluating median (7 vs. 2) and mode (5/10
vs. 2) values from both treatments. A distribution of transfer-amounts is shown in ﬁgure 2.






2, with n being the number of
participants, ri ∈ (0,1) being the transfer rate of player i, and t ∈ (0,1) the predicted transfer rate. To
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Figure 2: Distribution of Palestinians’ actions and beliefs.
Result 2: The formal presentation of the game inﬂuences Palestinian subjects’ beliefs
substantially. Stated beliefs on cooperative behavior are higher under the FK-condition
than in the WR-treatment.
SUPPORT: On average, under the FK-condition 6.05 Talers are expected to be transferred
from the opposite player, contrary to a remaining share of 2.75 Talers in the WR-treatment.
The observed treatment eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant (p = 0.0008, Mann-Whitney-test, two-
sided). This ﬁnding gets further support considering median (5 vs. 2) and mode (5 vs. 0)
values from both treatments.
Comparing actions and beliefs we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence. This holds
for both treatments.
4.2 Israeli Choices
Israeli aggregated actions and beliefs are presented in the following table 5:
Actions Beliefs
FK WR’ FK WR’
Mean: 4.40 4.55 3.40 3.40
Median: 4 5 4 4
Mode: 2 5 4/5 0
SD: 2.95 3.38 2.50 3.14
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for Israeli choices.
14Result 3: No evidence is found that the formal presentation of the game inﬂuences Israeli
subjects’ actions in a signiﬁcant way. Both conditions imply a similar level of cooperation.
SUPPORT: On average, under the FK-condition 4.40 Talers are transferred to the op-
posite player. Similarly, in the WR-treatment 4.55 Talers are chosen not to be taken
by the participants. There is no statistical signiﬁcant diﬀerence in behavior across the
two treatments (p = 0.9455, Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided). Furthermore, we observe
a general tendency to play according to the Nash equilibrium - the quadratic distance
to the Nash equilibrium is smaller in both treatments than the distance to the Pareto
optimum. However, in the FK-treatment the quadratic distance to the Nash equilibrium
(∆2 = 0.276) is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the quadratic distance to the Pareto op-
timum solution (∆2 = 0.396, p = 0.4039, Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-sided). The
same holds for the data from the WR-treatment. Here, the quadratic distance to the Nash
equilibrium (∆2 = 0.316) is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the quadratic distance to the
Pareto optimum (∆2 = 0.406, p = 0.5295, Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-sided) either.
Our ﬁndings are supported by considering median (4 vs. 5) values from both treatments.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Israelis’ actions and beliefs.
Result 4: No evidence is found that the formal presentation of the game inﬂuences Israeli
subjects’ beliefs signiﬁcantly. Stated beliefs on cooperative behavior under the FK-condition
are not substantially diﬀerent from those in the WR-treatment.
SUPPORT: On average, under both conditions 3.40 Talers were expected to be contributed
from the opposite player. No statistical evidence for diﬀerence can be found (p = 0.9671,
15Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided). This ﬁnding gets further support considering median (4
vs. 4) values from both treatments.
Contrasting actions and beliefs we ﬁnd slightly higher amounts in actions compared
to stated beliefs (4.40 Talers vs. 3.40 Talers) for the FK-treatment (p = 0.0467, Wilcoxon
signed rank test, two-sided). No statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence is detected under the
WR-condition.
4.3 Crossing and merging the data
In the following we want to compare results from both populations and assess cross-
cultural validity. Our experimental design allows to test for consistency of presentation
eﬀects, their direction and strength. First, we evaluate population-speciﬁc results from
the FK-treatment.
Result 5: Palestinians cooperate signiﬁcantly more under the FK-condition than Israelis
do. Moreover, under this condition Palestinians substantially state higher beliefs on oppo-
nent player’s cooperation than Israelis do.
SUPPORT: On average, Palestinians have transferred 7.10 Talers to their counterparts,
while Israelis chose 4.40 Talers in this treatment-condition. Similarly, on average Palestini-
ans expect the matched player to transfer 6.05 Talers compared to 3.40 Talers which reﬂect
Israelis’ expectations toward their counterparts (see table 4 and 5). Both diﬀerences are
highly statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.005 and p = 0.0058, Mann-Whitney test, two-sided).
In a next step, we take a closer look at the choices made under the WR-condition.
Result 6: Israelis cooperate more under the WR-condition than Palestinians do. Further-
more, under this condition the mean belief on cooperation by Israelis is higher than the
expectations quoted by Palestinians.
SUPPORT: On average, in the WR-treatment Israelis have left 4.55 Talers to their counter-
parts. Palestinians chose to contribute 2.65 Talers on average in this treatment condition.
Similarly, on average Israelis expect the matched player not to transfer 3.40 Talers com-
pared to 2.75 Talers which reﬂect Palestinian expectations toward their counterparts (see
table 4 and 5). The diﬀerence in actions is signiﬁcant (p < 0.076, Mann-Whitney-test,
two-sided). Comparing stated beliefs delivers no signiﬁcant eﬀect.
16Considering our ﬁndings from results 1-6 we can derive result 7:
Result 7: A formal presentation eﬀect is not consistently found across populations. More-
over, the relative level of population-speciﬁc contributions depends on the presentation of
the decision task.
SUPPORT: As results 1-6 show, Palestinian choices are sensitive to the formal presentation
of the two equivalent game designs whereas Israelis’ behavioral consequences - manifested
in taking a choice - are not to signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the treatment condition. This
yields a relatively higher Palestinian cooperation level in the FK-treatment and relatively
higher Israeli contributions under the WR-condition. This ﬁnding also shows that in both
treatments the average Palestinian transfers, or interaction, exceeds the Israeli level, once
in a more cooperative and once in a more non-cooperative manner.
Finally, in a last step of our analysis, we investigate all 40 observations (FK- and WR-
condition) gathered in the two societies. Table 6 gives an overview on actions and beliefs
from both samples.
Palestinians Israelis
Actions Beliefs Actions Beliefs
Mean: 4.88 4.40 4.48 3.40
Median: 5 5 5 4
Mode: 5 5 5 0
SD: 3.15 3.09 3.13 2.80
∆
2Nash: 0.334 0.287 0.296 0.192
∆
2Pareto: 0.359 0.407 0.400 0.512
Table 6: Descriptive statistics and quadratic distances for aggregated data from Palestinians and Israelis.
Result 8: In the aggregated data from both treatments no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
Palestinian and Israeli level of cooperation is found.
SUPPORT: On average, Palestinians contribute 4.88 Talers when both treatments are
considered. Similarly, Israelis add 4.48 Talers. There is no evidence for a statistical
diﬀerence among the involved subject-pools (p = 0.547, Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided).
The same can be stated for merged beliefs. Here, Palestinians on average expect to receive
4.40 Talers, and Israelis expect 3.40 Talers from their counterpart. Again, no statistical
diﬀerence can be detected across both subject-pools (p = 0.1938, Mann-Whitney test,
17two-sided). Moreover, we observe no substantial diﬀerence among the quadratic distances
to the Nash-equilibrium (∆2 = 0.334 and ∆2 = 0.296, p = 0.5470, Mann-Whitney-test,
two-sided) and to the Pareto optimum (∆2 = 0.359 and ∆2 = 0.400, p = 0.5470,
Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided) of transfer amounts from both societies. Our results
considering actions are supported by evaluating median (5 vs. 5) and mode (5 vs. 5)
values from both treatments. Equally, for stated beliefs we ﬁnd that median (5 vs. 4)
values do not substantially diﬀer11.
5 Summary and Discussion
The aim of this work was to demonstrate that a more complete methodological approach
is needed to explore the variety and origins of cooperative behavior speciﬁcally measured
in a cross-cultural context and to evaluate results adequately.
Merging the experimental application of two logically and strategically identical deci-
sion problems with cross-cultural research methods we demonstrated that data obtained
from one-sided experimental setups might lead to only partly valid results and conclusions
on population-speciﬁc behavior. This ﬁnding holds especially true if results are compared
and evaluated across cultural borders.
Our Palestinian results have shown that the formal presentation of the decision prob-
lem can inﬂuence subject’s choices and beliefs substantially. Cooperation and beliefs on
cooperative behavior are signiﬁcantly higher when subjects can create positive external-
ities toward each other compared to a situation where externalities are negative. In the
positive condition Palestinians are more willing to transfer higher amounts to voluntarily
lift the mutual welfare level to a higher stage. Contrary, in the second condition more neg-
ative beliefs about the opponent’s behavior are formed. In this conﬂict situation subjects
transfer more from the opposite player to ensure a guaranteed minimum payoﬀ. These
ﬁnding gives support to prior work by Andreoni (1995), Sonnemans et al. (1998), Willinger
and Ziegelmeyer (1999), and Park (2000).
One possible explanation for this consistent behavioral pattern might be that, even if
11Mode values also support this ﬁnding. There, 5 is the amount chosen the second highest time by
participants. This amount was chosen in 9 from 40 cases, contrary to the actual mode=0 which was chosen
10 times out of 40.
18the technical presentation of the implemented game designs was strictly neutral, Pales-
tinian participants perceive situations with potential negative externalities as more com-
petitive than situations with potential positive externalities. Another possible explanation
might be, that Palestinians seem to obtain a higher beneﬁt from doing a good rather than
from not doing a bad deed. Future studies have to analyze whether Palestinian behavior is
similar to Western subjects’ behavior as the mentioned public good game results suggest
or rooted speciﬁcally in Arabian culture. Herrmann et al. (2007) give evidence for the
latter conjecture. They have found, that Arabian participants are not - unlike most deci-
sion makers from Western populations who cooperate more under a punishment condition
- sensitive to the threat and enforcement of punishment in public good game setups.
Experiments with Israeli subjects yielded diﬀerent results. There, aggregated subjects’
choices and beliefs appear to be unaﬀected across treatments. No presentation eﬀect can be
veriﬁed. Israeli seem to show a similar behavioral attitude under both conditions. This fact
might be caused by a more systematic way of analyzing the decision problem. In Jewish
culture analytical cogitation is rooted in the tradition of the Talmud12. It is possible that
this tradition has inﬂuenced the strategic thinking of Israeli subjects (including secular
subjects) in our experiment knowing that they are interacting with countrymen. Further
studies should analyze the reason for the similar behavior displayed in both conditions.
Do Israelis perceive the two games as presentations of the same decision problem, or do
they apply diﬀerent approaches leading to similar behavioral consequences?
Comparing levels of cooperation under each of the conditions across subject pools
might lead to opposite conclusions on society-speciﬁc behavioral attitudes. Palestinians
display a relatively higher cooperation level and more positive beliefs on opponent player’s
contributions than Israelis when only the positive externalities condition is considered.
Contrary, Israelis cooperate relatively more and state substantially higher beliefs when
only the negative externalities condition is taken into account. However, when all data
gathered from each of the two populations are evaluated, we ﬁnd no evidence that relative
cooperation levels and stated beliefs are diﬀerent. These striking results would not have
been detected by the implementation of mere one-sided experimental designs.
Our study sheds new light on the impact of game presentation conditioned on societal
habitats. Furthermore, it raises further questions about the eﬀectiveness of presentation
12Aumann and Maschler (1982) analyzing the Talmud conclude that the solution regarding the division
of a man’s estate among his three widows is a game theoretic solution.
19conditions on value activation within subjects, their individual motivations and percep-
tions triggering diﬀerent cognitive processes leading to divergent behavioral consequences.
Finding answers to these issues is essential for the design of international institutions where
actors repeatedly interact under a variety of rapidly changing environments. Bargaining
and cooperation setups might be perceived diﬀerently across diﬀerent groups of decision
makers holding diﬀerent cultural backgrounds. The culture-sensitive adaptation of con-
stituting conditions is necessary for increasing mutual beneﬁts from cooperation within
institutions.
Future experiments in cross-cultural research should focus on repeated interaction of
diﬀerent cooperation schemes to elaborate cultural consequences of the clash of diverg-
ing behavioral patterns. Taking ﬁndings from two-sided experimental setups into account
might not only enrich standard socio-economic theory but also reﬁne our experimental
methodology. Therefore, we argue that for the purpose of deriving conclusions about
behavioral inclinations of populations, it is advantageous to make use of diﬀerent presen-
tations of logically identical experimental setups.
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24Appendix
Instructions for the experiment
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Please read these instructions very carefully. It is very
important that you do not talk to other participants for the time of the entire experiment. In case you do
not understand some parts of the experiment, please read through these instructions again. If you have
further questions after this, please give us a sign by raising your hand out of your cubicle. We will then
approach you in order to answer your questions personally.
To guarantee you anonymity you will draw a personal code before the experiment starts. Please write
this code on top of every sheet you use during this experiment. You will later receive your payment from
this experiment by showing your personal code. This method ensures that we are not able to link your
answers and decisions to you personally.
During this experiment you can make money. The currency within the experiment is ‘Taler’. The
exchange rate from Taler to NIS is:
1 Taler = 2.5 NIS
Your personal income from the experiment depends on both your own decisions and on the decisions
of other participants. Your personal income will be paid to you in cash as soon as the experiment is over.
During the course of the experiment, you will interact with a randomly assigned other participants.
The assigned participant makes his/her decisions at the same point in time as you do. You will get
no information on who this person actually is, neither during the experiment, nor at some point after
the experiment. Similarly, the other participant will not be given any information about your identity.
You will receive information about the assigned participant’s decision after the entire experiment has ended.
After the experiment, please complete a short questionnaire, which we need for the statistical analysis
of the experimental data.
25Description of the experiment (FK)
In this experiment you are randomly matched with another participant. You act as Person A, and the
randomly assigned other participant acts as Person B. You and Person B must simultaneously make a
similarly structured decision.
Person A and Person B ﬁrst receive an initial endowment of 10 Talers.
You now have the opportunity to transfer any part of your endowment to Person B. You can only
transfer integer amounts - thus, you can only choose amounts aA ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
The amount you transfer to Person B is doubled. That means that Person B receives twice the
amount you have transferred to him/her.
The randomly assigned participant acting as Person B is given exactly the same alternatives as you
have. He/she also has the possibility to transfer any amount to you. The amount Person B transfers to
you is also doubled. That means that you receive twice the amount Person B has transferred to you.
You will make your decisions simultaneously. During the course of the experiment neither person
receive any information concerning the decision of the other person.
How the income is calculated
Your personal income can be calculated as follows:
Initial endowment
- amount you choose to transfer to Person B
+ twice the amount b Person B transferred to you
= your personal income
26Description of the experiment (WR)
In this experiment you are randomly matched with another participant. You act as Person A, and the
randomly assigned other participant acts as Person B. You and Person B must simultaneously make a
similarly structured decision.
Person A and Person B ﬁrst receive an initial endowment of 10 Talers.
You now have the opportunity to transfer any part of Person B’s endowment to yourself. You can
only transfer integer amounts - thus, you can only choose amounts aA ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
The remaining amount - that is the amount that you do not transfer from Person B’s endowment
to yourself - is doubled. This means that Person B receives twice the amount that you do not
transfer from him/her.
The randomly assigned participant acting as person B is given exactly the same alternatives as you
have. He/she also has the possibility to transfer any amount to himself/herself. The remaining amount
that he/she does not transfer from your endowment to himself/herself is doubled. This means that you
receive twice the amount that he/she does not transfer from you.
You will make your decisions simultaneously. During the course of the experiment, neither person
receives any information concerning the decision of the other person.
How the income is calculated
Your personal income can be calculated as follows:
+ amount you choose to transfer from Person B to yourself
+ twice the amount Person B did not transfer from your endowment
to himself/herself
= your personal income
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